

**STAFF RIDE  
AND  
STAFF RIDE  
INSTRUCTOR NOTES**

PFN: EOAC-H-100-042  
DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1991

## ANNEX A: INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE

## LESSON TITLE: BATTLEFIELD STAFF RIDE

1. Training Methodology: Peacetime Mobilization
  - a. Type of Instruction: L / C / F / PE N/A
  - b. Time: 0 / 0 / 0 / 9.0 N/A
2. Lesson summary:
  - a. Task: Develop an understanding of the battlefield staff ride concept. Conduct a battlefield staff ride.
  - b. Conditions: Given a local battlefield, research material on the battle, transportation assets, students and a staff ride leader.
  - c. Standards: Identify the phases of a staff ride and develop a knowledge of how to lead one. Participate by discussing key events on the battlefield.
  - d. Safety: Weather conditions may impact on the support requirements for this exercise. Bring water during periods of high temperature and wet weather gear if appropriate. Stay away from animals and be conscious of insects, particularly ticks.
3. References: CMH Pub 70-21
4. Preparations:
  - a. Review reference material.
  - b. Ensure buses are scheduled.
5. Lesson Outline:
  - a. Introduction:
  - b. Practical Exercise:
  - c. Conclusion:

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ANNEX B: STUDENT GUIDE

LESSON TITLE: BATTLEFIELD STAFF RIDE

1. Lesson summary:

a. Task: Develop an understanding of the battlefield staff ride concept. Conduct a battlefield staff ride.

b. Conditions: Given a local battlefield, research material on the battle, transportation assets, students and a staff ride leader.

c. Standards: Identify the phases of a staff ride and develop a knowledge of how to lead one. Participate by discussing key events on the battlefield.

d. Safety: Weather conditions may impact on the support requirements for this exercise. Bring water during periods of high temperature and wet weather gear if appropriate. Stay away from animals and be conscious of insects, particularly ticks.

2. General Instructions: N/A

3. Sequence of Activities: This class follows the "Introduction to the Staff Ride" class and the "Preliminary Study" class.

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ANNEX C: STUDENT ADVANCE SHEET

BATTLEFIELD STAFF RIDE  
ADVANCE SHEET

1. Lesson: Battlefield Staff Ride

2. Lesson Objective:

Task: Develop an understanding of the battlefield staff ride concept. Conduct a battlefield staff ride.

Conditions: Given a local battlefield, research material on the battle, transportation assets, students and a staff ride leader.

Standards: Identify the phases of a staff ride and develop a knowledge of how to lead one. Participate by discussing key events on the battlefield.

Safety: Weather conditions may impact on the support requirements for this exercise. Bring water during periods of high temperature and wet weather gear if appropriate. Stay away from animals and be conscious of insects, particularly ticks.

3. Study Requirements: Review materials issued during the preliminary study phase and prepare briefings.

4. Computer Assistance Instruction: None

5. Supplementary Information: Bring a sack lunch and a beverage. The buses will depart from the Lincoln Hall parking lot at 0700 and will return at 1700. Bring training aids if necessary. Training will be conducted regardless of weather.

ANNEX E: ADMINISTRATOR'S GUIDE

LESSON TITLE: BATTLEFIELD STAFF RIDE

- |   |                  |                     |
|---|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Training Methodology   | <u>Peacetime</u> | <u>Mobilization</u> |
| a. Type of instruction:   | L/ C/ F/ PE      | N/A                 |
| b. Time:  | 0/ 0/ 0/9.0      | N/A                 |
| c. Time management;   |                  |                     |
| (1) Peace time: Ensure each student receives a minimum of 8:30 hours instruction. |                  |                     |
| (2) Mobilization: N/A   |                  |                     |
2. Lesson Sequence: N/A
3. Class Configuration: Field Study
4. Student to Instructor Ratio: 100:1
5. Student to Equipment Ratio: N/A
6. Training Support Materials and Equipment:
- a. Materials:
- (1) Students: Book, The Battle of Wilson's Creek by Edwin Bearss.
- (2) Instructors: Reference materials and instructor notes.
- b. Equipment: 44 passenger bus with driver.
7. Preparations:
- a. Schedule bus
- b. Ensure student materials are on hand in the quantity needed.
8. Disposition: Reorder books if necessary.

**The following are instructors notes.**

**They are not designed as a lesson plan.**

STOP #1  
Visitor Center Auditorium

I. Introduction

- A. MQS II says captains plan staff rides
- B. Review phases of staff ride
- C. Emphasize importance of preliminary study phase

II. Introduction to Staff Ride - Objectives

- A. Reinforce principles of war
- B. Reinforce tenets of Army Operations
- C. Provide examples of good and bad small unit leadership
- D. Provide an example of a staff ride to EOAC students

III. The Importance of Missouri

A. Transportation - logistics

1. Rivers

- a. Mississippi River
- b. Missouri River
- c. mouth of Ohio River

2. Overland Trail System - Control access to west - to use overland transportation routes west must travel through Missouri

- a. Santa Fe Trail
- b. Oregon Trail
- c. Smokey Hill Trail
- d. California Trail

B. Population - recruits, work force, logistics

- 1. 8th in US
- 2. largest west of Mississippi

C. Growing Industrial City - St. Louis

- 1. Provided Union with Ironclades

D. Resources in 1860 (west of Mississippi R)

1. 1st in following areas - Miles of RR, population, sawed lumber, cotton goods, wool, boots\shoes, value of live stock, value of farms, coal, # of banks

IV. Due to Importance AND spilt population, Missouri 3rd most fought over state

- A. 1162 engagements in 4 years
- B. Virginia most with 2154
- C. Tennessee 2nd with 1462

V. Show Movie

STOP #2  
Map Program

I. Introduce Terrain

- A. location of VC
- B. location of Bloody Hill
- C. location of Corn Field
- D. location of Sigel's Final Position
- E. location of Ray House

II. Point out route of Staff Ride

III. Discuss Lyon's operational plan in terms of Forms of Maneuver (FM 100-5) and the principle of war "maneuver"

A. Lyon conducts "envelopment" from the north with main U.S. force

B. Sigel conducts "turning movement" to establish a blocking position with secondary force

C. Overall, Lyon uses maneuver to avoid attacking across Wilson's Creek into the high ground and into the teeth of the pro-Confederate camp



STOP #3  
Picnic Shelter

I. Lyon

A. Description of forces - 5400 men

1. infantry - 4700
  - a. large # of "regulars"
  - b. some state unit's enlistment is up
  - c. compared to pro-southern forces better armed
2. cavalry - 475
  - a. outnumbered by Confederates considerable
3. artillery - 16 guns
  - a. equal number of Confederate guns
  - b. same type of guns on both sides

B. Operational Situation

1. much larger Confederate Army Group within one days  
march
2. no reinforcements expected
3. supply route not reliable
4. nearest friendly force at Rolla

C. Options open to Lyon

1. Retreat to Rolla
  - a. problems?
2. Hold Springfield
  - a. problems?
3. Take the Initiative and attack
  - a. problems?
4. Others?

D. Lyon's Plan - not clear, but appears to be a spoiling  
attack

1. take the initiative and attack
  - a. after a short battle retreat to Rolla
  - b. Lyon hoped the attack would keep the  
Confederates off balance and give his forces time to retreat to  
Rolla
  - c. divide force - Lyon's column & Sigel's column

## II. McCulloch

A. Description of forces - 10,000 men, 15 guns, large mounted force

1. three Armies
  - a. Confederates - McCulloch
  - b. Arkansas State Troops - Pearce
  - c. MO State Guard - Price
    - (1) not trusted by McCulloch
2. command structure

B. McCulloch's Plan

1. attack Lyon at Springfield

## III. Actions on August 9th

A. Rain - equipment (small arms)

1. no effect on Union
2. impact Confederates and they call off attack
3. Do not replace security
  - a. who's fault? McCulloch's? company commanders?

## IV. Read and discuss Vignette #1

## V. Move to stop #4

## VIGNETTE #1

General Lyon was seen approaching on his large dapple-gray horse. When he came to our company his words were:

Men, we are going to have a fight. We will march out in a short time. Don't shoot until you get orders. Fire low, don't aim higher than their knees; wait until they get close; don't get scared; it's no part of a soldier's duty to get scared.

It was a tactless and chilling speech; there was nothing in it of dash, vim or encouragement. It was spoken in a low tone and with a solemn look, and apparently with a feeling of exhaustion. He was dressed uniform, buttoned up to the chin, as if he were cold, although the weather was dry and roasting. We boys considered the speech as a very poor effort and entirely wanting in enthusiasm. He had better not have made it. On the other hand, dear old Irish General Sweeney made a speech to his cavalry, of which I have no notes except that he said among other things, "Stay together, boys, and we'll saber hell out of them." This had enthusiasm.

Eugene Ware  
1st Iowa

STOP #4  
North End of Approach Field

I. Lyon's force marched out of Springfield late on 9 Aug

A. Camped near present power plant and continued advance just before dawn on the 10th.

B. FM 100-5 says there are "four general forms of the tactical offense" (movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit).

1. Which was Lyon conducting? (movement to contact)

2. What is the purpose of a movement to contact? ("to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact")

a. Was this Lyon's movement to contact objective?

II. Confederates - have called off attack, failed to replace security

III. Cawthorn

A. sent out patrol - made contact with Lyon - reported to Cawthorn

B. basic missions of cavalry - reconnaissance, security, and economy of force

C. sent out Hunter (300 cav) to ascertain intentions of advancing enemy force (reconnaissance)

IV. "The desired result of the movement to contact is"? ("...to find the enemy. When this happens, commanders fight a meeting engagement")

A. Lyon's leading elements and Hunter's reconnaissance force have a meeting engagement.

V. How do commanders maintain "freedom of action once they make contact"? ("lead with a self-contained force that locates and fixes the enemy ... commanders hold the bulk of their force back so that when their lead forces make contact they can maneuver the majority of their force without becoming decisively engaged")

A. Does Lyon?

1. Lyon's lead forces

a. Plummer in line on the left

b. 1st MO and Totten's battery in the middle

c. Osterhaus deployed as skirmishers on the right

VI. Cawthorn

A. What is Hunter's mission now? (security)

B. Hunter forced south towards Cawthorn's camp

VII. Flank Security - Plummer sent across Wilson's Creek to secure left flank

VIII. Read Vignette #2, discuss OCOKA, advance to next stop

## VIGNETTE #2

The hills bore some scattering oaks, and an occasional bush, but we could see clearly, because the fires had kept the undergrowth eaten out, and the soil was flinty and poor. The few trees were rather large scrawling, and straggling, and everything could be distinctly seen under them all around.

Eugene Ware  
1st Iowa

STOP #5  
South End of Approach Field

I. Cawthorn

- A. Hunter has fallen back on Cawthorn
- B. Cavalry fights dismounted
  - 1. 1 out of 4 holds horses
- C. large Union infantry force moves forward - your options?  
(remember role of cavalry - reconnaissance, security and economy of force)
  - 1. pull back
  - 2. attack
  - 3. fight a delaying action (security)
  - 4. other?
- D. What did Cawthorn do? (fought a delaying action - security)
- E. Where do you deploy your troops
- F. Where did Cawthorn? (north face of Bloody Hill)

II. Lyon

- A. Six "attack options" (hasty, attack, spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, feint - demonstration)
  - 1. Which would you do?
  - 2. Which one is the most likely result of the meeting engagement? (hasty)
- B. What was Lyon's biggest enemy at this point? (time)
- C. What did Lyon do?
  - 1. deployed 1st KS on left of 1st MO and attacked
  - 2. example of hasty or deliberate? why?

III. Deitzler (1st Kansas)

- A. What did Deitzler do to inspire his men? Did it work?
- B. Read Vignette #3

IV. Cawthorn driven from the north slope of Bloody Hill

- A. 1st KS and 1st MO followed
- B. Lyon's main column moved around the head of the hollow

V. Move to Stop #6

### VIGNETTE #3

Before leading his Kansas into position Deitzler rode along his regiment's line, and one of the soldiers recalled:

electrified the spirits and hopes of his men, by uttering a few sharp emphatic sentences, that did more to arouse their feeling than the most elaborate speech, delivered by the most gifted and eloquent orator, could have done. Rising in his stirrups, he exclaimed in language more emphatic than reverent, "Boys, we've got them, d-m them.

After the colonel had finished his speech, he led his men up the hill on the double. As they scaled the hill, the Kansans sang:

So, let the wide world wag as it will,  
We'll be gay and happy.

STOP #6  
Crest of Bloody Hill

I. Andrews (1st MO) and Deitzler (1st KS)

- A. What was encountered as your units crested Bloody Hill?
  - 1. Enfilade artillery fire from Woodruff's battery
  - 2. Slowed Union advance
  - 3. What could Union leaders have done to push their men through the bombardment?

II. Lyon's lead force slowed, his main force began catching up, what could have Lyon done?

- A. Personally try to get the lead element to continue to advance
- B. Deploy a new lead element
- C. Deploy main force on Bloody Hill
- D. Other?
- E. What do all three of these options have in common?
  - 1. they take time
  - 2. time is still probably Lyon's biggest enemy

III. What did Lyon do? Allowed lead force to continue and deployed main body on Bloody Hill as needed.

IV. TOTTEN - Lyon calls up Totten's battery

- A. What are the three missions of field artillery?
  - 1. DESTROY
  - 2. NEUTRALIZE
  - 3. SUPPRESS
- B. What should Totten's mission have been?
- C. Effective? (caused only 3 casualties)
  - 1. Mission was to silence enemy battery
  - 2. With help of Du Bois' battery Woodruff was forced to stop firing. Too late?

V. Read and discuss **Vignette #4**

- A. souvenir hunting

VI. Move to Stop #7



#### VIGNETTE #4

Across the creek, perhaps about a third of a mile, a battery of artillery made a specialty of our ranks, opening out thunderously. We all lay down on the ground, and for some time the shells, round shot and canister were playing closely over our heads. Some few of the canister fell into our ranks. They were coarse cast-iron balls, about an inch to an inch and a half in diameter. Where they struck in the ground the boys hunted for them with their hands. Our company did not have much to do for a while in the way of shooting; we simply laid down on the ridge and watched the battery in front of us. When we saw the puff of the artillery we dodged and went down flat, and in the course of fifteen minutes gained so much confidence that we felt no hesitation in walking around and seeing what we could see, knowing that we could dodge the artillery ammunition. This battery was making a specialty of us, but we could evade their missiles; we could see the shells in the air when they were coming toward us, and could calculate their routes. In a little while two pieces of artillery were run up on the ridge between our company. These were Totten's and were afterwards increased. They started in to silence the enemy's artillery, and a concentration of fire began in our neighborhood near the cannon. The duel was very interesting and our boys stayed close to the earth. Considerable damage was done to our artillery, but they were not silenced. One of the large roan artillery horses was standing back of the gun and over the crest of the hill. A shell from the battery in front of us struck this horse somehow and tore off its left shoulder. Then began the most horrible screams and neighing I ever heard. I have since that time seen wounded horses, and heard their frantic shrieks, and so have all other soldiers, but the voice of this roan horse was the limit; it was so absolutely blood-curdling that it had to be put to an end immediately. One of the soldiers shot the horse through the heart.

Eugene Ware  
1st Iowa

STOP #7  
Sink Hole

I. Sink hole used as a Union Soldier mass grave

- A. Dead were removed after war to the National Cemetery in Springfield
- B. Confederate dead placed in local cemeteries
  - 1. After war a Confederate cemetery was established
  - 2. today is part of the National Cemetery

II. Weapons caused massive wounds

- A. Amputation was only way to treat wounds to the limbs
- B. 58 and 69 cal. bullets and balls used
  - 1. made from soft lead
  - 2. flattened upon impact and caused massive damage

III. Today's medical procedures could have prevented the death due to infections

- A. Probably could not repair the massive damage caused by the impact of the projectiles

IV. Read Vignette #5

V. Move to stop #8

## VIGNETTE #5

Soon after the battle ended the enemy, under a flag of truce, commenced attending to their dead, dying and wounded. Early Sunday morning, I was detailed as sergeant of a large force to finish the burial of the enemy's dead. Armed with shovel, pickaxe and spade, the detail proceeded to the principal point of the battlefield to complete this mournful task, which the enemy, unable to accomplish, had abandoned in despair. The ground was still thickly strewn with the ghastly and mangled forms. Fifty-three bodies were placed in a single grave, all gathered within the compass of one hundred yards. These were hastily covered with brush and stones, when the detail precipitately departed. The effluvia from the swollen, festering, blackened forms, already covered with worms was too horrible for human endurance. Hundreds unburied were left food for the worms, fowls and beast of the earth. No conception of the imagination, no power of human language could do justice to such a horrible scene.

W.H Tunnard  
3rd Louisiana

STOP #8  
200 Yards North of Edward's Cabin

I. Edwards Cabin

A. Location of Price's HQ

B. McCulloch, McIntosh, Price there eating breakfast

II. McCulloch receives messages from Rains

A. What were his responses?

1. Consider source and message
  - a. "20,000 & 100 guns"
  - b. Rains - disliked by McCulloch
    - (1) Dug Springs
2. McCulloch ignores messages

III. How does a commander influence a battle? (by presence, use of the reserve)

A. Where did McCulloch go? (presence)

1. McCulloch crossed WICR to go to his brigade

B. How did McCulloch use those troops immediately available - MO State Guard (use of the reserve)?

1. Told Price to handle Bloody Hill and left

C. By leaving Price to handle Bloody Hill what does this tell you about how McCulloch saw the situation?

1. Price has things under control
  - a. remember McCulloch's opinion of the MO State

Guard

2. His presence more important elsewhere
3. Other?

IV. Price

A. What units did he have immediately available?

1. Shattered Cawthorn's fighting on Bloody Hill
2. Slack's Division (650) (closest)
3. Clark's Division (270)
4. Parson's Division (142)
5. McBride's Division (605)

B. "Use of the Reserve" - Slack's Division comes up first. Where would you deploy it? Follow on units?

C. How did Price deploy as the units arrived piecemeal

1. placed Slack's Division with their right on the creek.
2. as other units came up he deployed them to the left

D. Personal Presence - Where would you go? Why?

1. Forward?
2. Stay with Slack's Division?
3. Edward's Cabin?
4. Other?

E. Where did Price go?

1. Up Bloody Hill to rally Cawthorn

V. Price is able to deploy most of MO State Guard infantry. As Lyon's lead elements slowly move down hill would you have waited for Lyon to bring the battle to you or counterattacked? Why?

A. What did Price do? (He waited until Lyon's lead elements [1st MO & 1st KS] engaged him, then he attacked with his left)

VI. Turning point in battle?

- A. Price attacked with his left up Bloody Hill
- B. Lyon began to lose initiative

VII. Compare Civil War unit organization to modern

Civil War		Modern
Regiment (COL)	=	Company (CPT)
Brigade (BG)	=	Battalion (LTC)

VIII. Read **Vignette #6**

IX. Move to Stop #9

#### VIGNETTE #6

Looking up, we could , ourselves, see a great crowd of men on horseback, some armed, and others unarmed, mixed in with wagons and teams and led horses all in dreadful confusion, scampering over the hill and rushing down toward us - a panic stricken drove. In another instant, we saw the flash and heard the report of Totten's guns, which had gone into battery on the top of the hill, not more than a thousand yards away, and were throwing shot into the flying crowd.

Cpt Thomas Snead  
Adjutant, Missouri State Guard

STOP #9 (optional)  
Wilson's Creek Bridge

- I. Is Wilson's Creek a natural obstruction?
- II. Did McCulloch divide his army into two parts by camping on both sides of WICR?
- III. Move to Stop #10

STOP #10  
Woodruff's Position

I. Woodruff

- A. What was Woodruff's mission before the battle?
  - 1. Positioned to guard the Wilson's Creek ford
- B. What is the Fire support methodology?
  - 1. Decide - Detect - Deliver (FM 6-20)
  - 2. Did Woodruff follow this system?
    - a. On 9 August he walked the field of fire
      - (1) planning in the "Decide" phase
- C. Who gave order to open fire?
  - 1. no one - leader initiative

II. Read and discuss **Vignette #7**

- A. officers acting as gunners good or bad leadership? Why?
- B. 1st concern of officer when badly wounded? Why?

III. Move to Stop #11



## VIGNETTE #7

It had been arranged between the company officers long before, that in our first engagement each should take the post of gunner at designated pieces. I fired the first shot and the others followed. Lt Weaver was struck within the first hour. He had just been relieved by his gunner, Sergeant Blocher, I believe, and, was struck a moment after with a solid shot, which broke his right arm and crushed his breast. Some one told me Weaver was wounded and wanted to see me. I went to him immediately, and he said, lying on the ground, his wounded arm across his breast, "I am done for; can't you have me moved?" I said, "Yes, immediately, and I will try to get a surgeon." He said, "All right; you better go back to your gun or post." I called Sergeant Button and told him to detail men to move Weaver.

Maj. W.E. Woodruff  
Pulaski Light Battery

STOP #11  
Ray House

I. Plummer

- A. What was your mission?
  - 1. Protect left flank
- B. Upon observing Woodruff's fire what did Plummer do?
  - 1. Tried to take out battery
- C. Who gave the order?
  - 1. no one - Plummer used his own initiative

II. McIntosh

- A. Units in your force?
  - 1. (3rd LA & 2nd AR Mounted Rifles - 1,000 men)
- B. McIntosh moves up, deploys units and finds Plummer behind a fence
  - 1. forward units forced to stop by Plummer's fire
- C. What did McIntosh do?
  - 1. charged Plummer and drove him from field
  - 2. initiative
- D. Du Bois' battery opens up and disorganizes McIntosh's command
  - 1. command retreats to Ray House to rally
  - 2. house comes under brief artillery fire

III. Plummer

- A. WITHOUT using hindsight did Plummer make right decision?
  - 1. doctrine calls for leader initiative
  - 2. when can a leader use his own initiative?

IV. Brief history of Ray House

V. Read Vignette #8 and #9

VI. Lunch

## VIGNETTE #8

The enemy were securely posted behind the fence, while our position among the bushes rendered it almost an utter impossibility to obtain a good view of them. Not a stone's throw from each other these lines of men, composed of old regulars and virgin volunteer regiment of Louisianians, were combating each other with dogged obstinacy. Men were dropping all along the line; it was becoming uncomfortably hot, when Cpt McIntosh dashed along the line, shouting "Get up Louisianians, and charge them! Do you all wish to be killed?" With a tremendous cheer, so fearful, coming from men under fierce excitement, they rushed on the foe with fixed bayonets. The regulars fled from the deadly charge. Over the fence, across the field, after the foe, did the boys charge with loud cheers, until they once more approached the enemy's battery within point-blank range. The battery immediately concentrated its fire upon the regiment as it began to form a new line of battle. Canister shot and shell were rained upon them until it became too uncomfortable to be withstood. The order was given to retire behind the protection of a hill immediately in the rear of the field. It was obeyed with zealous alacrity and the men decamped instantly, watching the flash of the enemy's guns as they retreated, and falling prostrate on the ground permitted the iron hail to pass over them, and then rise only to run and repeat the same manoeuvre, it was taking very practical lesson in the manual a la Zouave.

W.H Tunnard  
3rd Louisiana

## VIGNETTE #9

Early on the morning of the battle, John Phelps, armed with a Maynard rifle and a Colt's dragoon revolver, set out from his father's house for the fight. Accompanying him was one of his father's slaves, a negro man named George, another negro, Amos, belonging to Maj. Dorn of the Southern army, and Pleasant Hall and Robert Russell, two young men, citizens of the county. Phelps was the leader. Taking the Fayetteville road, the party encountered Lt Morton of the 2nd Kansas. The squad, now numbering six, hurried along and pretty soon encountered a picket of two men. Leaving the others to attract their attention, Phelps contrived to make his way to the rear of these pickets and coming upon them suddenly, leveled his Maynard and soon had them prisoners. The party then rode on and soon encountered another picket. Employing the same tactics as those used at the former post, Phelps succeeded in capturing a mounted arsenal in the person of State Guard Lt Kelly, who had three or four revolvers, a double barreled shot gun and a heavy dragoon saber. Buckling on the saber himself, Phelps rode up near the battlefield and encountering a party of Confederates induced a negro, belonging to an officer of the Louisiana regiment, to ride out to him, when forcing the negro to follow and keeping him between the enemy and himself, Phelps retired in good order! Nearer still to the battlefield, and at Ray's House, a good sized squad was encountered in the house and taken in. By now Phelps had captured nearly a dozen. Finding it unsafe to continue, Phelps returned to Springfield.

Stop #12  
Anywhere

I. LUNCH

Stop #13  
Sigel's Final Position

I. Sigel

A. Mission

1. Set up blocking position on Wire Rd
  - a. Type of Attack - Turning Movement

B. Forces (1200)

1. 3rd & 5th MO Inf (990)
2. Co. I, 1st US Cav (Carr) (65)
3. Co. C, 2nd US Dragoons (Farrand) (60)
4. Backoff's MO Artillery ( 6 guns, 85)

C. Sigel's First Position

1. Artillery fired on Confederate cavalry camps
2. cavalry fled to the north and northwest

D. Moved from 1st to 2nd position

E. Small Confederate force (Greer) deploys near fence

1. Sigel deploys force and shells with artillery
2. Greer flees to north and northwest

F. What did Sigel do

1. Farrand-Backoff-5th MO-3rd MO (left to right)
  - a. Carr was still east of creek
2. Artillery bombardment causes Greer's force to retreat

II. Read **Vignette #10**

III. Sigel advances to final position

A. How would you deploy your force?

B. How did Sigel deploy?

1. 3rd Mo right of road
2. 5th MO left of road
3. Backoff on road (two guns in reserve)
4. Carr on the left
5. Farrand on the right

C. What was good about the deployment?

1. biggest combat multiplier covering most probable avenue of approach
2. balanced and simplistic
3. mounted forces covering flanks
4. remember to keep a reserve

D. What is missing from Sigel's deployment?

1. no depth
  - a. nothing forward to provide security
  - b. reserve useless
    - (1) artillery direct fire only

- (2) can't fire over friendly troops
- 2. Other?

#### IV. McCulloch

- A. What have you been doing since you left Price?
  - 1. directed McIntosh to Cornfield
  - 2. directed 3rd LA after cornfield fight to move against Sigel

#### V. Sigel

- A. Unknown gray clad unit approached position
  - 1. remember the 1st Iowa was dressed in gray
- B. What did Sigel do?
  - 1. Sigel was afraid of being mistaken as a Missouri State Guard unit so he had the U.S. flag waved
  - 2. sent Corporal Todd to investigate
  - 3. too late - 3rd LA already 40 yards away
- C. 3rd LA opens fire along with 2 artillery batteries
- D. Sigel's infantry force ran from the field
  - 1. 5 of 6 guns captured
  - 2. infantry broke up and traveled one of two ways back to Springfield
    - a. south - east - north
    - b. southwest - north - east

#### VI. Farrand and Carr

- A. Review tasks of cavalry
- B. What should have Farrand and Carr have done? What did they do?
  - 1. Carr - traveled with group a
    - a. abandoned them
  - 2. Farrand - traveled with group b
    - a. gathered straggling Infantry
    - b. removed one gun

#### VII. Turning point in battle?

- A. 1/4 of Lyon's men and 1/3 of his artillery gone
- B. Threat to Confederate rear gone
- C. Confederates can now concentrate against Lyon

#### VIII. Discuss the tenets of Army Operations (initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility) and Sigel

#### IX. Read Vignette #11

#### X. Move to Stop #14

## VIGNETTE #10

Gen. Sigel soon gave the order to fire, which was responded to with rapidity, but our guns being on an elevation, the shots passed over their heads, creating a stamped but doing little if any damage to life or limb. In vain I and others urged the artillerymen to depress the guns. Either from inability to understand English or in the excitement, thinking it was only necessary to load and fire they kept banging away till the whole camp was deserted. The command then moved on till it reached the Fayetteville road and Sharp's house. While the command was taking position. I went into the abandoned arkansas camp where I found a good breakfast of coffee, biscuit and fried green corn. Most of the tents were open - a musket with fixed bayonet being forced into the ground, but up, and the flap of the tent held open by being caught in the flint lock.

Dr. S. H. Melcher



## VIGNETTE #11

The battle had begun. For about five hours we remained inactive in our position. No orders to advance came and no Sigel was seen. We could see how the enemy took his cannons to the hills. We could have prevented it easily, but had no orders. None of our officers would assume the responsibility, so we remained in positions, and only one shot was fired by the more than a thousand men. It was maddening and at the same time ridiculous. When the enemy had put his cannons in position, we got a taste of their fire. We had to disperse and retreat, leaving our cannons as booty of the rebels. From all sides we were showered with gun fire and rifle fire. All who valued their lives sought shelter as quickly as possible. I do not know who was to blame for this mistake. It will probably never be known.

John T. Beugel  
3rd Missouri

STOP #14  
Guibor's Battery or Bloody Hill Overlook

I. Review Lyon vs Price up to and including Price's 1st counterattack

- A. 1st MO and 1st KS (KS on left) on Bloody Hill
  - 1. Lyon is deploying rest of main force

B. MO State Guard deployed infantry and successfully stopped Lyon's advance

- 1. Price counterattacked with his left

II. What did Lyon do to counter the threat to his left?

- A. Moved reserved (2nd KS) closer to his right
- B. Attack repulsed and Missouri State Guard pulls back
- C. lull in battle

III. What did Lyon and Price do during the lull?

- A. Lyon redeployed forces
- B. Price deployed more forces into line

IV. Price was ready before Lyon and attacked up Bloody Hill with his whole line.

A. Why was Price so quickly trying to go over to the offensive?

- 1. shorter range of his weapon systems?
- 2. other?

V. Move to Stop #15 if at Guibor's Battery

VI. Move to Stop #16 if at Bloody Hill Overlook

STOP #15  
Between Guibor's and Totten's Battery

I. As you move forward towards Totten's position

A. Stop every few yards and discuss types of artillery  
projectiles

B. Discuss what advancing Confederates would have faced and  
what might of have kept the soldiers from running away in the  
face of such fire

II. Move to Totten's Position (Stop #16)

STOP #16  
Totten's Position

I. Review disposition of Lyon's forces

A. Crescent shaped

B. 2nd Kansas acting as reserve, 1st Iowa can take advance of interior lines and be used as a reserve

II. Prices 2nd attack engaged Lyon's entire line

III. Review how a commander influences a battle (use of reserve and presence)

IV. 1st Kansas begins to break. What are Lyon's options? (use of reserve)

A. Deploy one unit of reserve in support of 1st Kansas

B. Deploy both units of reserve in support of 1st Kansas

C. Counterattack with one or both units of reserve

D. Use reserve to conduct a retrograde

E. Other?

V. Lyon first moved the 1st Iowa to replace the 1st Kansas

VI. 1st Iowa became heavily pressed and Lyon decided to move up 2nd Kansas

VII. Move to Stop #17

STOP #17  
Lyon Marker

I. What did Lyon do to his force by committing the 2nd KS? - his force became decisively engaged

II. Review Lyon's overall intent. Did Lyon's actions seem to match his overall intent?

A. Did Lyon change his intent from a spoiling attack to fighting a decisive battle? When did he change intent?

1. when he deployed the 2nd Kansas?
2. on 9 August when he sent Sigel on a turning movement?

B. Can commanders change intent?

1. if not, why?
2. if so, what must they do?
  - a. did Lyon?

III. Where should Lyon go (personal presence)? Where did he go?

A. Lyon led the 2nd KS forward and was killed

B. MAJ Sturgis assumed command

IV. Read Vignette #12

V. Turning point of battle?

A. no Union reserve

B. Missouri State Guard seems to have gained the initiative

C. Union intent unclear

VI. Lyon's tactic worked - left now holding

VII. Price faced with problem of disengaging while decisively engaged with a force with greater firepower and greater range

A. Greer's cavalry force attacks Union right (principle of war maneuver)

B. some of Union forces had to deal with Greer

C. Price used distraction to disengage

VIII. Read Vignette #13 and move to Stop #20

IX. Move to Stop #18

## VIGNETTE #12

Early in this engagement, while General Lyon was leading his horse along the line endeavoring to rally our troops his horse was killed and he received a wound in the leg and one in the head. He walked slowly a few paces to the rear and said, "I fear the day is lost." I then dismounted one of my orderlies, and tendered the horse to the general, who at first declined saying it was not necessary. The horse, however, was left with him, and I moved off to rally a portion of the Iowa regiment, which was beginning to break. In the mean time the general mounted and swinging his hat in the air called to the troops nearest him to follow. The 2nd Kansas gallantly rallied around him, headed by the brave Colonel Mitchell. In a few moments the colonel fell, severely wounded; about the same time a fatal ball was lodged in the general's breast, and he was carried from the field a corpse. Thus gloriously fell as brave a soldier as ever drew a sword, a man whose honesty of purpose was proverbial, a noble patriot, and one who held his life as nothing when his country demanded it of him.

Maj. Samuel D Sturgis  
US Army

### VIGNETTE #13

... the enemy tried to overwhelm us by an attack of some 800 cavalry, which, unobserved, had formed below the crests of the hills to our right and rear. Fortunately, some of our infantry companies and a few pieces of artillery from my battery (also Du Bois') were in position to meet this demonstration and drove off their cavalry with ease. This was the only demonstration made by their cavalry, and it was so effete and ineffectual in its force and character as to deserve only the appellation of child's play. Their cavalry is utterly worthless on the battlefield.

CPT James Totten  
Co. F, 2nd U.S. Artillery

... then the cavalry scattered through the woods, leaving the wounded horses and men strewn around. We captured several dismounted men by ordering them in under cover of a gun. A flag was seen lying on the ground about 150 yard in front of us, but no one was ordered or cared to undertake to go and bring it in. In a few minutes a solitary horseman was seen, coming toward us, as if to surrender, and the cry therefore rose from us, "Don't shoot!" When within about 20 yards of that flag the horseman spurred his horse, and, leaping from his saddle, picked the flag from the grass, and off he went with it a flying. The flag bore the "lone Star of Texas, and we didn't shoot at the horseman because we liked his nerve.

Eugene Ware  
1st Iowa

STOP #18  
Bloody Hill Overlook or Totten's Position

I. Lull on Bloody Hill

A. What were Sturgis' options during this lull?

1. redeploy forces
2. retrograde
3. attack down Bloody Hill
4. other?

B. Did Sturgis really have the command and control at this point to conduct any of these options? Why? (no, Lyon had not kept the chain of command well inform of the actions during the battle and commander's intent was unclear and maybe not even followed by Lyon anyway)

C. What did Sturgis do?

1. Sturgis held a council of war to determine condition of forces

II. Before anything was decided Price began a 3rd attack

A. More Arkansas troops brought into the battle

1. two of Pearce's three infantry regiments deployed

B. Union line held, Price calls back attack

III. Lull on battlefield

A. Price used lull to organize another assault

1. 3rd LA reorganized and ready to join attack

IV. Sturgis

A. during the lull what were his options (remember entire force has been engaged, force tired and low on ammunition)?

1. retrograde to Springfield
2. attack
3. await Confederate's next move
4. others

B. What did Sturgis do?

1. retrograde

V. What are the three types of retrograde operations? (delays, withdrawals, retirements)

A. which was Sturgis trying to do? (withdrawal)

VI. Sturgis' covering force must conduct a delay

A. what are the two types of delays? (successive, alternate)

B. considering the terrain in the immediate rear (which has been walked by students) which would you do?

C. how did Sturgis do it? (alternate)

VII. Move to stop #19



STOP #19

Bloody Hill Overlook (okey to include as part of stop #18)

I. What did McCulloch's forces do when they found the Union forces gone from Bloody Hill - 3rd LA briefly pursued but called it off

II. Read Vignette #14

III. Why do forces exploit and pursue? (to exploit success and keep the enemy from reorganizing and regaining initiative)

IV. Outcome of battle

- A. Casualty figures from both sides
- B. Union forces retreated unmolested to Springfield
- C. continued retreat to Rolla unmolested
- D. McCulloch's and Pearce's troops returned to Arkansas because of political and supply problems
- E. MO State Guard advanced to Missouri River

V. Union force reorganized in Rolla

- A. began offensive movements early in 1862
- B. captured Lebanon
- C. captured Springfield
- D. Missouri State Guard retreated to Arkansas
- E. Union force pursued and defeated the Missouri State Guard and Confederate forces in the Battle of Pea Ridge
- F. Missouri remained a Union state

VI. Brief students on integration phase to be held at visitor center

VII. Continue to Stop #20

#### VIGNETTE #14

General McCulloch, myself, and our staff officers now grouped ourselves together upon the center of the hill. Woodruff's battery was again placed in position and Totten, who was covering their retreat of Sturgis received the benefit of his parting shots. We watched the retreating enemy through our field glasses and were glad to see him go. Our ammunition was exhausted, our men undisciplined, and we feared to risk pursuit. It was also rumored that reinforcements were coming to the Federal army by forced marches, but it was found the next day that the disaster to the retreating army was greater than we had supposed, and a few fresh cavalry troops could doubtless have followed and captured many more stragglers and army stores.

Brig Gen Nicholas Bart Pearce  
Arkansas State Troop

STOP #20  
Visitor Center

- I. Debriefing - review staff ride phases
  - A. Preliminary Study Phase - done in classroom
  - B. Field Study Phase - just completed
  - C. Integration Phase
- II. Integration Phase - discuss lessons of Wilson's Creek
  - A. principles of war
    - 1. security
    - 2. surprise
    - 3. maneuver
    - 4. other principles of war?
    - 5. tenets of Army Operations
    - 6. commander's intent
    - 7. others?
- III. Student evaluation
- IV. Staff Ride complete